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 Fifty-one fishermen in the coastal villages of Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani 
were interviewed to discover the current state of fishing in these areas.  Each area has its 
own Village Fishermen Committees and those committees were also a subject of interest, 
interviewing their members as well as Fishery Department Officials to gain an 
understanding of how the committees function and their success.  Results of fishermen 
interviews revealed a large number of differences between Kizimkazi Dimbani and 
Jambiani.  Village Fishermen Committees were well attended by participants in both 
villages and seem to function as strong institutions within the communities studied.  
Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani are both situated within the Menai Bay Conservation 
Area, and governed by its rules and regulations.  However, enforcement is limited within 
this area and knowledge of the regulations is as well.  The regulations that fishermen 
were aware of in each village perhaps reveal the most common illegal practices there.  
The perceived effectiveness of patrols differed largely between the two study sites, which 
was attributed to the fact that two of the three patrol boats for the Menai Bay 
Conservation Area dock in Kizimkazi Dimbani.  Most fishermen noted that many illegal 
methods of fishing were still being used, causing damage to fish stocks.  Potential 
policies to alleviate the problems identified through interviews are discussed using a 
broad definition of policy that includes the social, economic, and biological factors, 
which influence policy outcomes. 
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The Nature of Zanzibari Fisheries 
Zanzibar’s fisheries are vitally important to coastal communities and the fishing 
industry has a large effect on society as a whole.  Fish are not only a key source of 
protein in the Zanzibari diet, but also provide the livelihood upon which roughly 40,000 
fishermen depend. (Jiddawi, 2012) Many other livelihoods exist related to fishing; 
namely boat building, fish mongering, and the creation and sale of fishing gear.  The 
fishing industry in Zanzibar has seen enormous growth since 1990 when there were only 
8,365 fishermen. (Phelan and Stewart, 2008) 
Like fleets in other East African coastal areas, Zanzibari fishermen constitute an 
artisanal fleet.  It is comprised of small boats, which use fishing technologies that are not 
capital intensive, and which remain within a few kilometers from the shoreline.  The area 
of fishing is restricted by the distance boats can travel, and the only permitted gears are 
ones with low efficiency as a means to keep catch sizes small; in this way fish stocks in 
Zanzibar have historically been maintained without requiring additional policies.  Nearly 
all fishing activities on the island utilize the following four methods: line fishing 
(mshipi), fish traps (dema), nets with holes for small fish to escape through, and nets with 
smaller holes to catch sardines. (Jiddawi, 2012) Fishermen in Zanzibari waters have 
recently adopted outboard motors to increase the distance they may travel in response to 
near shore fishery overexploitation and deterioration. (Khamis Ali Pandu, Interviews) As 
more and more fishermen join the industry, artisanal methods of fishing will need 
additional attention to keep fish stocks at healthy levels. 
Fishing Laws within Zanzibar 
Fishing methods currently outlawed in Zanzibari waters include spear-guns, 
noxious or poisonous substances, explosives, and nets or dema traps with smaller than 
authorized holes (varies by net type and location). Additional methods can be prohibited 
illegal by the rules governing specific areas. (RGZ, 2010) First time offenders are “wisely 
talked to” by the local authority and their gear is confiscated. (Juma Haji Ame, Halfan 
Isah, Interviews) Second time offenders receive a fine ranging from 100,000tsh to 
10,000,000tsh (62.50USD – 6,250USD) for violations relating to explosives or noxious 
gasses, while all other violations (spear-gun use, illegal nets or dema traps) receive a fine 
of 100,000tsh to 5,000,000tsh (62.50USD – 3,125USD). (RGZ, 2010, Juma Haji Ame, 
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Interviews) Third time offenders are charged and required to appear in court and if found 
guilty can be sentenced to serve jail time, pay a fine or both. (RGZ, 2010, Juma Haji 
Ame, Interviews) In 2011, five cases appeared before a judge, and as of April 2012, two 
cases have resulted in court hearings this year. (Juma Haji Ame, interviews) According to 
Juma Haji Ame, an employee of the Menai Bay Conservation Office headquarters in 
Stone Town, the number of court cases (and fishing law violations generally) is 
decreasing because knowledge of the law and its enforcement has effectively extended to 
many fishing communities. 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Zanzibar (part of the Republic of 
Tanzania) extends 200 miles from the eastern coasts of Pemba and Unguja out to sea, but 
an industrial fleet capable of traversing such distances does not exist, at least not of 
Zanzibari origin.  Foreign fishing boats are permitted to operate in these areas provided 
they buy a one time fishing vessel permit, which costs 48,000USD for trawlers and 
21,600USD for finfish as of 2003, a foreign boat must also purchase an annual fishermen 
license, which costs 162USD. (FOA, 2004) In addition, boats from the Tanzania 
mainland fish in the EEZ of Zanzibar, with trawling permits costing 68USD and finfish 
permits for 4.8USD. (FOA, 2004) These fees go to the Tanzanian government however, 
and not directly to Zanzibar.  Within the EEZ, there are areas designated for artisanal 
fishermen’s exclusive use, which are referred to as the territorial waters of Zanzibar. 
(RGZ, 2010) Intrusions by industrial vessels into artisanal zones are a growing problem 
as the number of industrial ships has increased over the last ten years. (FOA, 2004) 
Governance Strategies of Zanzibari Fisheries and Issues 
Zanzibar’s fisheries are managed by the policies and regulations of the Zanzibar 
Fisheries Department.  Like other agencies within Zanzibar’s government, the Fisheries 
Department is responsible for locating external donors to satisfy its budget requirements, 
which naturally gives these external donor organizations a large amount of decision-
making power.  While the Fishery Department of Zanzibar institutes policies, it is 
important to understand the role these external organizations play, as funders through this 
process. (Levine, 2004) The donors tend to be foreign NGOs. 
The Fisheries Act of 2010 charges the Department to monitoring fish stocks, 
create policies that encourage sustainable fishing activity, educate fishermen, and 
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promote higher value addition and improved marketing of Zanzibari fish. (RGZ, 2010) It 
is also charged to protect and maintain small-scale fishing. (RGZ, 2010) The Fishery 
Department typically takes a top-down approach, designating Marine Protected Areas 
(MPA’s), limiting methods and requiring licenses for fishermen and their boats, each of 
which must be renewed annually. (FOA, 2004)  
One exception to its customary top down approach is the Department’s method 
for collecting its per kilogram tax on each fisherman’s catch.  .  The Department hires a 
beach recorder, or in Swahili – bwana dikos for each landing site, generally an educated 
person or leader of the community where they work.  Utilizing community structures 
already in place makes fishery management simpler and more effective.  The Department 
reduces the transaction costs involved with enforcing the per kilogram tax by decreasing 
time spent traveling from home to the landing site and eliminating the difficulty of 
familiarizing oneself with a foreign community’s fishing activities. (de la Torre-Castro, 
2006) While the development of the bwana dikos has certainly improved efficiency 
within the Fisheries Department, these local employees face different difficulties as the 
channel for information between government bodies and the local resource users 
themselves. Researcher Torre-Castro (2006), classifies these difficulties as: 
The four dilemmas: kinship, loyalty, poverty, and control,” concluding that each, 
“seriously jeopardizes the flow of the extensive knowledge that the bwana dikos actually 
have, and reduces the effectiveness of the formal governance systems for coastal fisheries 
management.” (Torre-Castro, 2006) 
Because of close community ties, the duties of a bwana diko are often overlooked in 
favor of maintaining their good standing within the community. 
To understand Torre-Castro’s conclusions in action, an explanation of the Swahili 
term muhali is in order.  It translates literally to “impracticability”, but author Khalfan 
explains its true meaning as an influential cultural norm within Swahili society.  “[In this 
context muhali means] neglecting to inform others of any pessimistic or negative realities 
to protect them from disappointment, but eventually creating greater disappointment 
when the true circumstances are revealed.” (Khalfan, 2011) The bwana dikos discussed 
by Torre-Castro (2006), are in the difficult position as the pivot point between the 
government and their own community.  Not wanting to reveal negative realities, these 
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officials often mask opinions, distort information and adopt entirely “different roles 
according to the situation,” in an attempt to please the two groups to whom they are 
accountable. (de la Torre-Castro, 2006) Muhali limits the effectiveness of bwana dikos, 
as transmitters and enforcers of government policy, but muhali permeates Zanzibari 
culture and effects everyday transactions unrelated to fishing.  For example, when one 
orders a dish from a restaurant if the restaurant is missing a key ingredient their response 
will be to go out and purchase it to fulfill their guest’s request, despite imposing a delay 
of three hours to your food. (Khalfan, 2011) Traditional policy-making does not 
incorporate the cultural norms of muhali, or other salient cultural norms, which can 
critically effect management outcomes. 
Evidence provided by Tobey (2006), reveals that poverty is another one of the 
driving forces motivating the breaking of rules designed to conserve resources for future 
use.  As stated by the Mr. Said Ali Mbarouk, Zanzibar Minister of Livestock and 
Fisheries, “the need for fishermen to catch fish in order to survive is compelling many 
small-scale fishermen to resort to illegal fishing practices.” (Daily News, 2012) Thus, 
improvements to the institutions governing community fisheries, must work towards 
outcomes that develop the social, economic, and biological aspects of communities in 
question.  These factors play a significant role in the willingness of communities to 
accept management strategies and their eventual success. (Cunningham and Boss, 2005) 
As these features may differ between communities, the communities themselves must be 
included in the policy-making process or risk overlooking behavior that will affect a 
policy’s outcome. A study conducted in the Chwaka Bay Conservation Area by de la 
Torre-Castro and Lindstrom (2010), revealed the need for “a broader institutional 
approach that better considers norms, values and cultural issues.” (Simonsen, 2010) 
Policies must be developed and tailored on a community-by-community basis for them to 
succeed.  Torre-Castro and Lindstrom’s study of the Chwaka Bay Conservation Area 
supports this approach.  They conclude that, “gaining knowledge about the wide 
institutional setting takes time but the investment is worth it in the long run.” (Torre-
Castro and Lindstrom, 2010) 
In 1997 the Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) was created to combat 
destructive fishing practices and the pressures of uncontrolled fishing, introducing 
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management plans for the Menai Bay Area. (Torell et al., 2006) The WWF sponsors the 
Conservation Area while other donors include USAID, MACEMP, Woodshole and the 
British Government. (Levine, 2004; Torell et al., 2006) The management strategy utilizes 
community support by creating Kamati za Wavuvi or Village Fishermen Committees 
(VFC) for each shehia (village) within the area.  Villages in the MBCA elect ten 
fishermen by ballot to sit on a committee, which in turn selects a chairman.  Fishermen 
are elected for three years and may be reelected indefinitely. (Aboss Juma, Simai, 
Interviews) “The VFC organize fisheries patrols within their areas, and report illegal 
fishing activities to the government” whose trained patrols are responsible for arresting 
violators. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Fishermen from their respective VFC engage in 
“reef monitoring, data collection, and a number of volunteering activities like beach and 
coral reef cleaning.” (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Further duties of the VFC involve 
collecting information to improve conservation, encouraging fishermen to adopt 
conservation ideas and practices, and acting as liaisons, like bwana dikos, between local 
communities and the Fisheries Department. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006)  
On the community level, problems experienced while fishing are brought to these 
VFC members who relay them to government officials during quarterly kamati tendaji 
meetings (including all villages).  Each village within the MBCA sends their respective 
VFC chairmen to the quarterly meeting where problems are discussed in a dialogue led 
by Fisheries Department officials.  Solutions are agreed upon and regulations applicable 
across the Conservation Area are approved and promulgated by the Fisheries Department. 
(Halfan Isah, Interviews) These regulations are then adapted to each village by their 
respective VFC. (Halfan Isah, Interviews) Each VFC holds monthly or bi-monthly 
meetings with the fishermen they represent, relaying information concerning policies, and 
creating a space for discussion of issues. (Aboss Juma, Haji Saburi Simai, Interviews) 
The creation of the VFC committees has had many benefits.  As management 
shifted to a more community level, feelings of ownership of the fisheries have been 
increased. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Fishermen interacting with the resource on a 
daily basis can now express the problems they face, and discuss solutions.  Fishermen 
now act as enforcers of the regulations, notifying the patrols when bad practices have 
been sighted and this in turn reduces the time, effort and petroleum expended by the 
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MBCA’s patrol boats.  By including fishermen in the enforcement strategy, patrols have 
more effectively stopped intrusions by mainland boats as well as the use of illegal gears. 
(El Kharousy and Juma, 2006, Juma Ame, Interviews) 
The Menai Bay Conservation Area stretches from Mazizini, less than 5km from 
the urban center of Zanzibar Town to Bwejuu – see figures 1 and 2, while the seaward 
boundary extends 61km from shore. (Torell et al., 2006) Three boats patrol this area: two 
small and one big, each with powerful outboard engines. (Juma Haji Ame, Interviews)  
Back in 2003, the Menai Bay Conservation Area was smaller; only from the Fumba 
Peninsula to the southern tip of Unguja an area of 470 square kilometers, yet even then 
difficulties arose with the size of the patrol area. (Torell et al., 2006) Only the two small 
patrol boats existed then, and like today they were stationed in Kizimkazi Dimbani. 
(Levine, 2004) The problem in 2003 was that these two patrol boats were assigned a huge 
area to monitor.  Fuel costs for the powerful motors and the long distances patrols had to 
travel, combined to make enforcement in the vicinity of Kizimkazi Dimbani more 
effective than the western side of the conservation area near Fumba. (Levine, 2004) This 
is a contributing reason why dislike of the MBCA varies from village to village.  Other 
differences in geography, infrastructure, and proximity to the Menai Bay Office’s capital 
(patrol boats, and radio headquarters) create divergent responses to the conservation 
initiatives between Menai Bay villages. (Levine, 2004) Recently however, a Menai Bay 
Office was created in Fumba and there is a further plan to create another office in 
Jambiani in the next couple of years. (Halfan Isah, Interviews) These locations have been 
chosen due to the high volume of tourists visiting these villages. 
Figure 1: Menai Bay Conservation Area (MBCA) in 2006, which has since been 
expanded to include the area along the east coast up to Bwejuu. 
 The territory under conservation has been sizably increased since 2003
the areas between Mazizini and Fumba and 
boat has been added to the patrol crew, the
documented by Levine (2004)
doubled.  Currently, the patrols fuel revenue is generated by a tax on tourism of three 
dollars per person, but 30% of the
Colbert
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insufficient to meet petrol needs of the patrols.  As a result, patrols are often incapable of 
responding to reports due to a lack of petrol. (Levine, 2004, Halfan Isah, Interviews) Mr. 
Shomari, the head of a patrol team, believes “underfunding is the biggest challenge,” 
explaining that additional boats are needed to improve the patrols’ success. (Daily News, 
2012) The VFCs of the Menai Bay villages use the tax revenue to counteract beach 
erosion, repair broken vessels, compensate injured fishermen and in other ways provide 
an additional layer of resilience to fishing communities. (Aboss Juma, Interviews) Other 
sources of income for VFCs are the dago regulations, whereby migratory fishermen pay 
to fish and camp in a given villages’ area. (Aboss Juma, Interviews) The dago is opened 
and closed at the discretion of the Menai Bay Office leaving the tax as the only constant 
source of income.  Further sources of revenue are needed both for the patrols and for the 
VFCs.  
Although VFCs have generally improved the lives of fishermen, they have created 
some problems that future management adjustments must keep in mind.  Occasionally, 
VFCs have made decisions out of line with conservation principles, including decisions 
to continue using destructive methods, which sacrifice future benefits for the present. (El 
Kharousy and Juma, 2006) Also, “opportunism has been repeatedly observed” as self 
interested VFC members allow illegal practices to go on, share patrol schedules with 
wrongdoers or warn them of unscheduled patrols. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) One 
other consideration for community-based management policies is kinship: effectively 
restricting enforcement to non-community members as friends and family fail to report 
each other’s violations.  Potentially the most damaging failure of the VFC management 
system occurs when the committees fail to act as the intermediary between government 
and communities of fishermen.  (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) If VFCs stop representing 
the views of their communities fishermen cooperation within the management system 
disintegrates. (El Kharousy and Juma, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Study Area: 
Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani 
within the Menai Bay Conservation Area
fishing activities and to reduce the cost of travel as they are nearby.
also selected for their different locations 
Jambiani looking out across the Indian O
increased up to its current boundaries
seen in figure 1.  
Figure 2: Circled in red are the two study areas, while the two arrows denote the 
boundaries of the MBCA, and the distance that the 
Both villages have a fair amount of tourist
known for its dolphin tours, attracting tourists for day trips
white sand beaches.  Hotels along the beaches are common in both locations
Colbert
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, see figure 2., but the size of the area before can be 
three patrol boats must cover.
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Jambiani there are many more.  Jambiani is situated along the east coast of Unguja, 
where the tourist industry is well established. (Torell et al., 2006) 
The two villages have fishing areas that overlap with neighboring communities.  
Kizimkazi Dimbani’s fishing area extends east to Makunduchi and west to Mtende, with 
fishermen from these villages conversely entering the areas close to Kizimkazi Dimbani.  
Jambiani’s fishing area stretches north to Bwejuu and south to Makunduchi with vessels.  
Both villages are small: Kizimkazi Dimbani has a total of 280 fishermen and a population 
of 1360, while Jambiani has 260 fishermen and a population of 8,000. (Kamati Chairmen, 
Interviews, Torell et al 2006, Zanzibar Action Project, 2012)  Industrial fishing boats 
from mainland Tanzania often intrude on these small-scale fishing areas.  As you can see 
in the map below, the Tanzanian mainland is about twenty-five miles from Zanzibar and 
closer to Kizimkazi Dimbani than Jambiani. 
  
Figure 3: Marked on this map by circle and
the proximity of the Dar es Salaam urban area.
Aside from fishing, other
livelihoods, generally occupied by women, 
mollusks by combing tidal areas and 
work women in Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani are able to generate
provide additional food for their families.  Other alternative employment opportunities 
have been orchestrated by the MBCA, including beekeeping, tree planting, mangrove 
replanting and protection of existing mangroves. 
Seasonal variations of ocean currents affect
Colbert
 arrow are the two study areas, also visible is 
 
 livelihoods exist in both villages.  These alternative 
include harvesting of octopus and othe
seaweed farming. (Torell et al., 2006) Through this 
 income and 
(Torell et al., 2006) 
 the hotspots for fishing in Zanzibar.  
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Fishermen in Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani often do not go out to sea when the 
monsoon switches from NE to SW.  The shift in ocean current causes southern seas to 
become too dangerous for small boats.  When fishing is safe however, these two villages 
see a large number of migratory fishermen, from elsewhere in Unguja and mainland 
Tanzania. 
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Methodology: 
   Six days were spent in Kizimkazi Dimbani, and four days in Jambiani.  In 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 28 fishermen were interviewed and in Jambiani 23 fishermen were 
interviewed.  First-hand experience was gained through accompanying a fisherman on his 
boat and seeing the practices they use in the areas around Kizimkazi.  Additionally, 
members of the Fisheries Department were interviewed in a less structured way to gain 
an understanding of the VFC system for village based management.  In each village 
visited, the VFC chairman was interviewed, and in Kizimkazi Dimbani three other 
members of the VFC were present with the chairmen.  Furthermore, local contacts 
provided by Doctor Narriman Jiddawi, who were knowledgeable about general fishing 
practices and problems were interviewed.   
Interviews of fishermen were carried out on an opportunistic basis using a 
translator, and sessions were undertaken at different times of day to get a more diverse 
sample.  Fishermen were found by walking through the village, approaching houses of 
known fishermen or by finding fishermen socializing in different town areas.  Fishermen 
were interviewed sometimes alone and other times in groups, one after another.  
Translators were of great help finding fishermen to interview, but also likely did not 
sample randomly, instead choosing fishermen they knew.  This is unfortunate, but given 
that researchers are not always received kindly it is an unavoidable source of error for 
someone requiring a translator in Zanzibar.  The questions asked can be found in 
appendix I.  Responses were relayed by the translator and recorded.  Participants were 
thanked for their time and the next participant was located.  Data was then compiled in 
Microsoft Excel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Results: 
I.  Biographic Information 
A. Age of Fishermen
 Average age of fishermen (both villages): 41.49
  Average age Kizi
  Average age Jambiani: 39.17
B. Number of Years Fished
 Average years fished (both villages): 20.17.
  Average years K
  Average years Jambiani
C.  Origin of Fishermen
All fishermen were native to the village in which
II. Reasons for Becoming a Fisherman
Figure 7: Reasons why fishermen in Kizi
14%
3%
11%
4%
7%
Kizimkazi Dimbani
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18%
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 Figure 8: Reasons why fishermen in Jambiani become fishermen.
A plurality of respondents in both villages voiced “no other 
for fishing.  A similar response to this, and the second most common response was my 
town is a “fishing village”.  A small percentage in each village responded that they fish 
because they “enjoy fishing”, 3% and 9% for Kizi
Another point of interest is that in Kizi
noted that a lack of education was responsible for their decision to become a fisherman 
while in Jambiani this reason was not voiced by respondents
responses, under the other category were: 
chose between the sea or the forest.
III.  Tradition of Fishing within Families
Responses were practically identical between Kizi
72.24% and 73.91% of respondents from the respective villages responding “yes”
father had been a fisherman as well
IV.  Equipment Used 
A. Breakdown of Boat Type by Village
30%
9%
9%
9%
Colbert
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because there were many fish back then, and I 
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43%
Jambiani
No other job
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 Figure 5: The composition of fishing vessels in Kizi
Figure 6: The composition of fishing vessels in Jambiani.
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  The most common boats in both villages were 
outriders on both sides that provide balance.  
with a sail.  It should be noted that a higher
Dimbani own fiber boats with motors than in Jambiani.  The percentage of 
boats larger than ngalawas and without outriders
was the number of people renting or sharing boats
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B.  Fishing Gears 
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 Figure 10: The composition of gear used by Jambiani fishermen.
 The most significant difference between the two vill
Dimbani line fishing is almost the exclusive method of fishing, while Jambiani fishermen 
use a more diverse set of technologies.  In Jambiani the use of multiple gears wa
much more common and a gear type exclusive to
by 9% of respondents.  
C. Communication or Navigation
In Kizimkazi Dimbani
sea, but in Jambiani only 8.69% of fishermen
were discussed, although to help respondents answer the question 
not understand – suggestions of maps,
V.  Perception of Catch Size
A. Average Weekly Catch
When analyzing responses of average catch size over a week, both gear used, and 
boat type were analyzed for their influence on catch size.
Table 1: A breakdown of catch size based on gear used by fishermen in 
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012.
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Figure 11: A comparison between both villages of catch size per week based on gear 
used. 
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fish using a large net and multiple boats, so this is the reason for the larger catch, still the 
number offsets the other data and has been kept out of the above graph. 
You can notice that Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen are more successful with 
fishing line and that fishing line and the use of a net causes a large increase for Dimbani 
fishermen.  Jambiani’s highest catches each include the use of dema trap in common.  
The standard deviations are very high and thus error is also very high for this data. 
B. Average Weekly Catch by Boat Type 
Table 2. Average catch size by boat for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Kizimkazi Dimbani # of Boat Weekly Catch (kg) Standard Deviation 
Fiber w/ motor 5 144 81.73 
Ngalawa 18 54.08 35.94 
Rents/shares 3 44.5 28.65 
Dhow 3 86.25 90.16 
Fishes w/out boat 0   
Canoe 0   
Overall Average         29 71.41  
Jambiani    
Fiber w/ motor 2 57.5 3.53 
Ngalawa 16 39.91 31.04 
Rents/shares 2 252.75 349.66 
Dhow    
Fishes w/out boat 2 6.5 0.71 
Canoe 1 15  
Overall Average 23 55.96  
 
 
Average Catch per Week (kg) by Boat Type 
 Figure 12: both villages average catches per week based on type of boat used
Fishermen using fiber boats with motors (fiber w/) are more 
other fishermen.  Comparing the two
more successful than Jambiani fishermen.  In boat types used by each village,
fishermen report higher average catches per week.
C.  Amount of Catch Consumed
Table 3. Average % of catch kept by fishermen
and Jambiani, 2012. 
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when the average catch is above 100kg.  While it appears that this is a more serious 
phenomenon in Jambiani, only three responses were recorded in that category there, 
while there were nine over 100kg from Kizimkazi Dimbani, making the Jambiani data 
less accurate. 
D. Perceptions of Changing Catch Size 
Respondents noted, almost uniformly, that an average week’s catch was larger 
when they first started fishing.  Excluding two outlandishly large perceived changes in 
catch size: 4900% and 18,081% (from Kizimkazi and Jambiani respectively), an average 
week’s catch many years ago, for Kizimkazi Dimbani was 188.60% larger than today, 
and for Jambiani 97.11% larger. 
 
Figure 13: A graph of Years Fished vs. change in weekly catch size for Kizimkazi 
Dimbani. 
 The above graph shows Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen’s years fished and their 
perceived change in the average week’s catch.  The correlation coefficient R^2 is 0.15 
revealing a slight correlation between the variables.  For Jambiani fishermen even this 
slight correlation did not exist.  Four fishermen from Jambiani responded that their catch 
had increased since they started fishing. When asked why, three responses were due to a 
lack of experience with fishing when they first became fishermen, while one respondent 
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said there were more fish today.  These responses likely affected the overall trend for 
Jambiani. 
VI. Markets for Fish 
A. Location of Markets 
 In Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen either sold their fish right off the beach, or 
would transport them – also sometimes paying somebody to transport them – to Stone 
Town by dala dala (bus) where a larger market returned higher profit for their efforts.  
63.63% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen sell from the beach, while 22.72% sell both at 
the beach and in Stone Town.  9.09% sell only in Stone Town and 4.54% of fishermen 
interviewed sell either in Stone Town or in Dar es Salaam on the Tanzania mainland, 
about 25 miles from Kizimkazi Dimbani. 
 Jambiani fishermen, with the exception of three respondents, all sell off the beach.  
Many respondents noted that they sell to either middlemen, or villagers.  Also some noted 
that they sell directly to hotels and restaurants.  One of the respondents who does not sell 
in Jambiani, sells in Stone Town, while the second sells in both Jambiani and Stone 
Town and the third sells up the eastern coast from Jambiani: in Paje and Bwejuu as well. 
B.  Changes in the Price of Fish 
Table 4. Perceptions of how the price of fish has changed for fishermen of Kizimkazi 
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Increased Fluctuates Decreased Remained the same 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 78.57% 14.29% 3.57% 3.57% 
Jambiani 73.91% 8.70% 4.35% 8.70% 
Responses are similar for both villages: the price of fish is increasing.  Many 
times it was noted that the price fluctuates based on the season, due to fishermen’s 
abilities to get fish or not get fish during the SE monsoons.  When the sea gets rough 
fishermen are more cautious, thus returning to shore with fewer fish.  Also discussed 
regularly was the idea that the actual price has remained the same because cost of living 
increases have kept pace with fish prices. 
C.  Perceived Reasons for Price Changes 
Many answers were given, but in the interest of simpler results responses were 
compacted into the following categories: Tourism, Cost of Living (including inflation and 
cost of equipment increase), Higher Demand/Lower Supply (including more buyers, 
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more fishermen, less fish and population growth), and Bad Markets (including 
middlemen setting the price levels and distance from large markets), Seasonal and 
Unknown.  Many respondents voice multiple reasons for the changes in price and these 
responses were counted as individual responses, thus the percentages add to over 100%. 
Table 5. Reasons provided for changes in the price of fish in Kizimkazi Dimbani and 
Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Tourism 
Cost of Living 
Increase 
Higher Demand/Lower 
Supply 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 17.86% 39.28% 46.43% 
Jambiani 17.39% 43.48% 13.04% 
(cont) 
Bad 
Markets Seasonal Unknown 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 3.57% 10.71% 0.00% 
Jambiani 13.04% 8.69% 4.35% 
 One additional response of interest was that the use of nets was causing the price 
to increase. 
VII. Effort Spent Fishing 
A.  Time Spent Fishing Currently 
Table 6. Average days fished in a month for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Now Before 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 17.91 21.04 
Jambiani 18.65 18.41 
 Eighteen of fifty-one fishermen fished the same amount now as when they started.  
Thirteen respondents fish more now than before and nineteen fished more before than 
they do now. 
B.  Change in the amount of Time Spent Fishing and Reasons for this 
Change 
 In Kizimkazi Dimbani, four respondents fish more today than when they first 
became fishermen due to: inexperience, fewer fish nowadays (x2), and not having a 
family to provide for in the past.  Many of the older fishermen interviewed responded that 
they fished more before because they were younger and stronger.  Many fishermen also 
noted that they enjoyed fishing more back when they started and went out more days of 
the month.  Two respondents now have another job, which limits the time they spend 
fishing. 
 In Jambiani fishermen also noted on multiple occasions that there were fewer fish 
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now, and that other jobs had been found to help support themselves.  One respondent 
noted that before he did not have a family to support and also a single respondent noted 
that inexperience was the reason he fished less before.  Three respondents noted that they 
had started fishing while still in school and for this reason had only fished on the 
weekends when they first became fishermen.  One more interesting response was from a 
fisherman who also makes a living as a witch doctor.  He fishes fewer days now, due to 
there being more work for him as a witch doctor. 
C.  Pressure Felt by Fishermen 
Table 7. Pressure to spend less time fishing broken down by village and by who is 
pressuring for Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Village 
From 
fishermen? 
From fisheries 
dept? 
From 
both? 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 83.33% 0 0 
Jambiani 4% 4% 13% 
 Shown above, 83.33% of Dimbani fishermen feel pressure from other fishermen 
to spend less time fishing.  Jambiani fishermen however, do not generally feel pressure 
from other fishermen; 21% responded that they feel pressure of some kind, and of those 
21%, 13% experience it from the Department as well as fellow fishermen.  While some 
Jambiani fishermen do feel pressure, it is not nearly as pervasive as in Kizimkazi 
Dimbani. 
VIII. Enforcement of Fishing Regulations 
A.  Fishermen Participation: Reporting Violations 
Table 8. How violations are reported by fishermen, and to whom are fishermen reporting 
in Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Call from Boat: 
Upon Return to Shore 
Find:   
Do not 
Report 
 
Menai Bay 
Office Committee 
Menai Bay 
Office Committee Either Shehah 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 28.57% 14.29% 3.57% 14.29% 25.00% 0.00% 14.29% 
Jambiani 0.00% 4.35% 21.74% 21.74% 0.00% 4.35% 47.83% 
 In Kizimkazi Dimbani, 42.86% of fishermen report violators by calling either the 
Menai Bay Office or a member of the VFC from their boats, while in Jambiani this 
number is only 4.35% of fishermen.  This is due to 46.42% of Kizimkazi Dimbani 
respondents bringing cell phones with them fishing, but in Jambiani only 8.69% of 
fishermen bring cell phones.  In Kizimkazi Dimbani 42% of fishermen notify an official 
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upon return to shore, while in Jambiani this number is slightly higher at 48%.  One of the 
largest differences is the numbers of fishermen who do not report, which in Jambiani is 
almost 50% of respondents. 
B.  Perceived Effectiveness of Menai Bay Patrols 
Table 9. Perceived Effectiveness of MBCA Patrols by fishermen in Kizimkazi Dimbani 
and Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Yes No Sometimes/A little bit 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 35.71% 32.14% 32.14% 
Jambiani 30.43% 65.22% 4.35% 
 Responses of “sometimes” or “a little bit”, were confusing, because in many ways 
if a patrol is only effective some of the time, then it is not effective at stopping bad 
methods of fishing, but at the same time these responses are different from “no’s” 
because the respondents are making clear that the patrols do at times function effectively 
and therefore are not entirely useless.  An interesting finding from interviewing Haji 
Saburi Simai, the Chairman of the Jambiani VFC, was that patrols are less effective 
because they fear the reaction of violators who often respond with violence to the seizure 
of their illegal gears. 
IX.  Knowledge of Management Strategies 
A. Knowledge of Regulations in the MBCA 
 Of those with knowledge of regulations, two or three regulations were gained 
from each fisherman.  Each of these responses is counted individually and percentages 
reflect overall awareness of specific policies among all fishermen interviewed.  Only 
responses heard more than once were included in the table below: 
Table 10. Percentages of fishermen aware of specific fishing regulations in Kizimkazi 
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012. 
Fishing Regulations 
Kizimkazi 
Dimbani Jambiani 
No Spear Fishing 45.45% 4.35% 
No Stun Poison 0.00% 17.39% 
License for Boat and Fisherman 4.55% 4.35% 
Don't pull nets - destroys corals 13.64% 13.04% 
Avoid Juvenile Fish through:   
No Small-holed Nets 54.55% 56.52% 
No Small-holed Dema 9.09% 4.35% 
General Avoidance 4.55% 4.35% 
 Additional responses that appeared only once include: no use of dynamite, no 
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swimming with your gear, no using big nets deep underwater, no use of spear-guns, and 
that in Kizimkazi Dimbani there is an area close to the village designated for older 
fishermen, allowing them to continue fishing despite lower levels of fitness.  This last 
regulation was one created by the VFC of Kizimkazi Dimbani and the respondent who 
explained its existence to me was a member of the committee. 
 Another fact of interest is that 13.64% of respondents from Kizimkazi Dimbani 
and 43.48% of respondents from Jambiani could not recall a single fishing regulation. 
B.  Knowledge of Traditional Methods of Management 
  Of the forty-four respondents asked this question, thirty-two had no knowledge of 
a custom, tradition or taboo.  In Kizimkazi Dimbani, four respondents explained 
traditional gears used, and five others explained that it was dangerous to go fishing when 
the sea was rough.  In Jambiani, two respondents recalled that years ago there had been a 
no fish area in the channel of the lagoon that was only fished during hard times, and two 
others recalled that there had been an octopus harvesting season partnered with a season 
of no octopus harvesting.  Neither of these practices is still included in present 
management. 
X.  Participation of Fishermen in VFC 
Table 11. Percentage of fishermen who attend VFC meetings in Kizimkazi Dimbani and 
Jambiani, 2012. 
Village Yes Sometimes No 
Kizimkazi Dimbani 75.00% 10.71% 14.29% 
Jambiani 69.57% 4.35% 21.74% 
 A few responses were further explained: in Jambiani, a fisherman remarked that 
he goes to meetings when a representative from the Fisheries Department is present (he 
was counted in sometimes), and also one Jambiani fisherman said “not yet” (he was 
counted as a no). 
XI.  Present Difficulties with Fishing 
Table 12. Largest issues for fishermen and the number of responses in Kizimkazi 
Dimbani and Jambiani, 2012 
Kizimkazi Dimbani Responses 
Illegal Methods Still Used 12 
Small-holed Nets Still Used 5 
Illegal Methods Used by Villagers 1 
Illegal Methods Used by non-Villagers 1 
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Illegal Use of Legal Methods (eg, using nets deep) 1 
Menai Bay Patrols 8 
Communication btwn Kamati and Fish dept. 1 
So many methods Legal/Illegal 1 
Some want to preserve others don't care 1 
None 1 
Jambiani  
Small-holed Nets still Used 11 
Illegal Methods 5 
Gear Interference btwn/among Fishermen 3 
Lack Fishing Gear 3 
Boats Break/Sink 1 
Cannot go far from Shore 1 
Harder to get fish 1 
Kamati Corrupt 1 
Capture of Illegal Gears Harms Fishermen 1 
Fish dept. tries to stop fishermen from fishing 1 
Doesn't know 1 
 The most common responses in both villages were persisting uses of illegal 
methods, on many occasions small nets were specifically noted.  In Kizimkazi Dimbani 
specifically, the second most common problem was related to the Menai Bay Patrols; 
either they would not stop the bad practices, that they were not always ready to go to sea, 
they didn’t really care about enforcing the regulations or the officials were in league with 
fishermen practicing illegal methods.  In Jambiani some of the most common issues aside 
from illegal gear were issues of gear interference among fishermen, namely nets 
destroying dema traps or nets interfering with fish line users.  Also, commonly heard 
responses in Jambiani were: lack of technology and capital, inability to fish further out 
from shore, competition with fishermen from elsewhere, and the problem of boats 
breaking down while out at sea.  Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen voiced none of these 
concerns. 
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Discussion: 
I.  Differences between two villages: Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani 
A.  Capital Intensity 
Fishing in Jambiani generally appears to be less capital intensive than Kizimkazi 
Dimbani.  Kizimkazi has twice as many fiber-bodied boats with motors as Jambiani, as 
well as finding no fishermen who operate without boats in Kizimkazi Dimbani.  The data 
gathered by Levine (2004) posits that 50% of vessels in Kizimkazi Dimbani are equipped 
with motors.  The differences between the two sets of data could result from Levine 
(2004) including all boats while this paper’s data is only looking at fishing vessels, 
excluding vessels for tourism activities.  Another piece of evidence for higher capital 
intensity in Kizimkazi Dimbani is that when asked about the problems they face, 21.74% 
of Jambiani fishermen noted a lack of gear, as their main problem while this issue did not 
arise for Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen.  Differences in catch sizes also emphasize the 
point that fishing is less capital intensive in Jambiani. 
B.  Reporting Capabilities and Perceptions of Enforcement 
The number of fishermen who bring phones with them to sea is much higher in 
Kizimkazi Dimbani than Jambiani.  This seriously affects patrols abilities to respond to 
violations as they depend on fishermen to relay information of violators’.  Almost 50% of 
Jambiani fishermen do not report violations at all, and those that do report upon return to 
shore must deal with a long delay between sighting the infraction and when the patrol is 
notified.  Coupled with the fact that no patrol boats exist in Jambiani, but two are 
stationed in Kizimkazi Dimbani you would expect patrols to be more effective in 
Kizimkazi.  This is seen in the data, as 65% of Jambiani fishermen do not think the 
patrols are effective, while 68% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen think that the patrols 
are effective at least some of the time.1  The effectiveness of patrols in both locations 
must be improved to allow regulations to take their full effects. 
C.  Catch Size and Markets 
The data collected on catch size per week, by boat type and by gear used reveals 
some differences between the two villages.  Perhaps Kizimkazi Dimbani is a more 
                                                          
1
 35.71% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen think the patrols are effective, while 32.14% 
believe the patrols are effective sometimes or a little bit. 
 Colbert-Sangree 34 
productive fishing area, and that explains the difference in average catch per week or it 
could relate to past fishing practices.  The difference in catch size per week translates to 
higher profits for Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen, and greater financial security.  Despite 
Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen being slightly better off, based on catch size per week, 
both villages consume close to equal percentages of their own catches.  This is interesting 
because you might expect a plateau to occur, whereby fishermen consume up to a certain 
number of kilograms and no more, however as Kizimkazi Dimbani consumption is on par 
with Jambiani (as a % of the total catch per week) it would seem that catching more fish 
translates to eating more fish.  This possibly reveals differences in the availability of 
markets to each village.  With many hotels in the area nearby Jambiani there is high 
demand for fish.  However in Kizimkazi, where tourism is focused around morning 
dolphin tours, it seems fishermen consume more fish themselves as the demand for fish is 
less.  Data gathered on markets reveals that 36% of Kizimkazi Dimbani fishermen seek 
out larger markets than the beach-landing site, while only 13% of Jambiani fishermen 
take their catch beyond the beach.  This provides evidence for the above reasoning that 
there is higher demand for fish in Jambiani than Kizimkazi Dimbani. 
 There is a general consensus that average weekly catches have decreased since 
fishermen first entered the market.  One reason for this decline in catch size could be that 
fish stocks have decreased, which many respondents did make note of in their interviews.  
Also possible however, is an overall increase in the number of fishermen reducing the 
catch size of each individual fisherman.  Most likely a combination of the two above 
factors is causing weekly catches to decline.  According to Pomeroy, due to poverty and 
the high cost of entering and exiting the market, “as long as small-scale fishermen can 
obtain a positive return, they will continue fishing.” (Pomeroy, 2011) As more fishermen 
enter the small-scale fishing market the overall catch is spread over a larger number of 
people.  If all of these fishermen take a survival strategy to fishing, catching as much as 
they can each day, then the overall catch will shrink.  This situation reduces the welfare 
of all those involved with the fishery, by shrinking individual catches and endangering 
the future existence of the resource. 
II.  Price of Fish Increases but not Welfare   
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 The price of fish is increasing, but as many respondents noted so is the cost of 
living.  Fishermen interviewed were very familiar with the notion of supply fluctuations 
influencing the price, and it is for this reason that a concerted effort to reduce the size of 
catches is possible.  As part of the knowledge base is already well understood fishing less 
could increase welfare for all involved with the fishery by increasing the price of fish.  
From the perspective of fishermen the “purpose of a fishery is to produce income rather 
than fish, and so costs of catching the fish have to be taken into account.” (Cunningham 
and Boss, 2005) Catching fewer fish raises the price of the fish that are caught, while 
requiring less effort from fishermen.  As long as markets are appropriately responsive, 
the revenue of fishermen could be maintained while reducing the time and effort spent 
fishing, effectively increasing the welfare of fishermen. 
III.  Pressure to Fish Less and Overcapacity 
Pressure to spend less time fishing can reveal overcapacity2 within a fishery.  As 
catch sizes become smaller, the result of many fishermen and fewer fish in the sea, 
competition and pressure felt by fishermen increases.  If capacity were at its optimal 
state, this pressure to fish less would be uncommon because catch sizes would not be 
shrinking.  In Kizimkazi Dimbani where 83% of respondents feel pressure to reduce 
fishing efforts from other fishermen, there seems to be overcapacity.  This pressure does 
not exist as strongly in Jambiani.  Perhaps because the gear used by Jambiani fishermen 
is more diverse and less competition exists due to a greater diversity of species in 
Jambiani.  Or due to larger markets in Jambiani, additional fish caught does not reduce 
the price of fish for other fishermen as it might in a smaller market situation.  Another 
cause for differing levels of pressure could be that Jambiani fishermen are less educated 
about fishing and do not fully understand the danger of overcapacity, while Kizimkazi 
Dimbani fishermen are exposed to these dangers more often living in a town where a 
MBCA office is located.  The other option is that overcapacity is less of a problem in 
Jambiani.  As perceptions of past weekly catches are lower in Jambiani than in Kizimkazi 
Dimbani, perhaps fish stocks have not deteriorated as much in Jambiani and overcapacity 
                                                          
2
 Capacity for fisheries is defined as a fleet’s ability to catch fish, therefore overcapacity 
occurs when a fleet’s ability to catch fish is greater than the fishery’s ability to replenish 
itself. 
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is in fact less of a problem.  No conclusions can be drawn without further research 
looking into the actual state of fish stocks. 
IV. Management Strategies 
A. Knowledge of Current MBCA Regulations 
 In both locations knowledge of the regulations governing fishing in the MBCA 
was sparse. Although the interviewee was asked to identify only two or three regulations, 
a general understanding of the laws in effect was not present.  This was seen to a greater 
extent in Jambiani, where 43.48% of respondents couldn’t answer with a single 
regulation.  The difference in awareness between the two villages is likely a function of 
having a Menai Bay Office located in Kizimkazi Dimbani, while such an office is not 
present in Jambiani.  The issues that were noted by fishermen from each village perhaps 
suggest the fishing methods causing the biggest problems in their areas.  Using this logic, 
small-holed nets are the largest problems for both locations, followed by the use of spear-
gun’s in Kizimkazi Dimbani and stun poisons in Jambiani, with the third most common 
illegal method being the use of drag nets in both locations.  Complete knowledge of the 
policies governing fishing in the MBCA by fishermen was very uncommon, and likely 
the result of the transaction costs associated with providing these small coastal villages 
with the needed information.  Making information of illegal practices more available to 
fishermen will reduce their use, as many fishermen do not know of the illegality of their 
practices.  Also, since village fishermen are the ones charged with reporting sightings of 
bad practices, enforcement will be improved if fishermen know the extent of the methods 
they are supposed to report. 
B.  Understanding and Use of Traditional Management Strategies 
 The information about customs, traditions and taboos revealed that for the most 
part neither village is aware of, or practicing any traditional methods of fishery 
management.  It is likely that in Kizimkazi Dimbani this question was not translated 
effectively.  Answers varied widely in their nature from what gears are traditionally used, 
to general caution of the sea during rough times.  In Jambiani translation was more 
effective and a few traditional management methods were uncovered, however in general 
fishermen were ignorant of community organized strategies of management. 
C.  Acceptance of and Participation with VFC 
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 The data on attendance of VFC meetings was reassuring.  This newly created 
institution as part of the strategy for managing fisheries seems to have high participation 
rates within both villages.  Attendance is slightly lower in Jambiani, most likely due to 
less effective patrols and a more distant connection to a Menai Bay Office.  Still, 
attendance is 70-75% in both villages and management initiatives must utilize these 
meeting places to their advantage and as a channel for future policies.  Resilience is a 
goal of SSF management, and past attempts at management from the small coastal village 
of Kayar in Senegal, the many islands of Mauritania, and the Pacific Halibut Fishery have 
revealed the need to incorporate social, economic and biologic factors into the 
management scheme. (Cunningham and Boss, 2005) The creation of VFCs seems 
successful in satisfying the cultural aspects of the MBCA’s strategy as it has been 
incorporated into the existing structures of these communities. 
V. Effectiveness of Patrols and Proximity to MBCA Office  
The problems of fishing in Kizimkazi Dimbani are the use of illegal methods and 
ineffectiveness of the MBCA patrols.  Jambiani fishermen agreed with Kizimkazi 
Dimbani fishermen on the problem of illegal methods, but made no mention of the 
patrols.  As patrols are constantly seen in the docking area of Kizimkazi Dimbani, their 
presence is constant, while Jambiani fishermen do not see the patrols or Menai Bay 
Officers very often.  Additionally, less awareness of the regulations in Jambiani might 
reduce the perceived problems of patrols ignoring violators.  Also a factor in the 
effectiveness of Jambiani patrols is the reality that patrols often fear violent reactions 
when attempting to enforce laws and seize illegal gears. (Haji Saburi Simai, Interviews) 
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Conclusion: 
 Kizimkazi Dimbani and Jambiani, although both being governed by the same 
policies and management schemes as part of the MBCA, differ in many ways regarding 
their relationship with nearby fishing areas.  The composition of fishing vessels, gears 
used, the ability of fishermen to aid in enforcement, average catch sizes per week, levels 
of pressure to reduce time-spent fishing felt by fishermen, the perceived effectiveness of 
patrols, and knowledge of MBCA regulations all differ between Kizimkazi Dimbani and 
Jambiani.  The policies of the MBCA have improved conditions of fishing in general by 
reducing the frequency of illegal practices however; within the MBCA many villages 
receive more effective management than others.  The location of MBCA capital has a 
large influence on the success of patrols, but even in these locations there is plenty of 
room for improvement as illegal practices are still seen frequently by fishermen.  
Improving the effectiveness of patrols however, is not a simple issue.  Fishermen lack the 
communication equipment to relay information of violators, the MBCA is underfunded 
resulting in a lack of patrols and petroleum for patrol boats, and corruption exists within 
patrols who do not always stop illegal practices.  Each of these problems adds complexity 
to the dilemma of enforcement.   
Although the price of fish is increasing, the welfare of fishermen is not.  This 
reveals the need for a more comprehensive management plan.  Evidenced by the pressure 
within the Kizimkazi Dimbani fishing community to fish less, overcapacity is a problem 
in this area and management should account for these concerns as well.  Knowledge of 
traditional management methods was very uncommon in both villages, thus new policies 
must be created to solve these problems.  Participation within VFC meetings is high 
within both villages and the potential for these meetings to accomplish additional 
management goals in the future is promising. 
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Recommendation: 
The MBCA covers a large portion of Unguja.  The most pressing issues currently 
include but are not limited to: enforcement issues, fishermen being unaware of the laws 
governing fishing, a lack of management that takes into account the differences existing 
between villages within the area, and a lack of funding.  Policies must be crafted to 
remedy these issues, but key throughout this process is using a broadened definition of 
policy, to account for the cultural norms that govern community relations.  As McConney 
and Charles (2008) write, “the delineation between social and ecological (and between 
nature and culture) is artificial and arbitrary.”  Policies must take into account the 
structures currently in place in each village to develop successful management schemes.    
One of the greatest strengths of MBCA villages is the connectedness of their 
communities.  While this is often the culprit of policy failures as shown by muhali in the 
issue of bwana dikos, if matched with the correct management strategy, these strong 
communities could support resilient systems.  If for example, patrollers each came from 
the communities they were meant to protect, they would be less likely to allow illegal 
practices to continue as their fellow community members would be the ones suffering 
lower catch sizes due to ineffective patrols.  Although this effort would likely reduce 
illegal practices, some patrollers might still act in self-interest, accepting bribes to allow a 
foreign vessel’s entry.  To remedy this issue, there should be a reward-based system, 
perhaps on a monthly basis, that gives salary bonuses to patrollers who effectively stop 
illegal practices.  If for example, patrollers in the MBCA recorded the number of vessels 
apprehended by patrol teams and each month the patrol vessel that successfully stopped 
the most boats received a bonus to their salary, enforcement would become spirited as 
patrols seek the monthly salary bonus.  The acclaim of being the month’s most successful 
patroller could be handed out during monthly VFC fishermen meetings and in this way 
successful patrollers would feel appreciated for their efforts.  By providing patrollers with 
a financial incentive to enforce the laws, they will be less likely to accept bribes, and by 
publicizing their success in VFC meetings they can gain social recognition for good 
work. 
To improve knowledge of fishing regulations within the MBCA postings of the 
regulations could be placed on the beach where fishermen anchor their boats.  Although it 
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is expensive to install and maintain signs in the many villages of the MBCA, the measure 
would increase knowledge of illegal fishing regulations, as fishermen would see the signs 
every time they went to sea and positively effect knowledge of management strategies. 
Despite differences that make management a tricky task, these communities are 
not entirely dissimilar.  To create effectively manage the MBCA it is essential that each 
village be visited and some degree of education for fishermen of the different 
management options occur.  This would take a considerable investment of time and 
effort, but it is likely that successful management schemes for these villages would be 
similar.  The creation of a portfolio of management schemes to present to villages within 
the MBCA would simplify this process and each village could choose a strategy 
appropriate to its circumstances.  The goal here is to increase the welfare of fishermen by 
reducing the time they spend fishing while keeping incomes relatively stable, and at the 
same time allowing fish stocks to recover to increase future catch sizes.  Management 
strategies must be adopted for each village, to account for their different fishing 
relationships and make management as successful as possible. 
One of the difficulties with this tactic is that villages have overlapping fishing 
territories.  One way to deal with this fact is by zoning the different areas of Menai Bay.  
Zones in this arrangement would not overlap, but if tied to the current system of vessel 
licensing fishermen with more mobile boats could purchase the rights to fish in multiple 
zones, through the purchase of their annually renewed fishing licenses.  By color coding 
the zones and placing tags that correspond to the different zones on each licensed boat, 
enforcement could be made easier within this arrangement.  The current system of 
enforcement, adjusted through the addition of financial incentives for patrollers, could be 
used to enforce this zoning policy.  As fishermen will be purchasing the rights to different 
fishing areas, the policies would be self enforced (as fishers who do not purchase the 
rights to an area where they are fishing will be reported by those who did), with the 
exception of kinship limiting within community reporting.  This exception would be 
minimal however, as it would generally be limited to the zone closest to their village, and 
entering other zones, with different villages’ fishermen, would result in them being 
reported by non-related fishermen. Also, if introduced through the channel of VFCs with 
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appropriate education explaining the policies and reasons for them, communities would 
hopefully accept and adopt such a policy. 
Currently policies extracting resource rents are largely unsuccessful due to the 
issue of bwana dikos, muhali, poverty and kinship discussed earlier.  As mentioned 
above, if management arrangements can be found for the many villages within the 
MBCA, this opens the opportunity for the creation of a revenue generator.  This revenue 
could be directed to VFCs efforts to increase their community’s resilience and to provide 
more fuel for patrol boats. 
Additional funds could be gained by liquidating gears confiscated by Menai Bay 
Patrols.  In Kizimkazi Dimbani, many ships confiscated were beached onshore, not being 
used and their value was depreciating.  While most gears confiscated cannot be sold due 
to their illegality, some can and this is a source of additional revenue. 
Although only a few weeks were spent gathering information throughout this 
study, the issues were not difficult to observe.  Living within these villages, talking with 
fishermen and gaining a surface understanding of the problems they face, some 
semblance of the scope of the entire issue has been exposed.  Future research about 
fishery management is needed, especially research defining fish stock levels now and 
uncovering data or perceptions of past stock levels.  It is my hope that these small coastal 
communities receive more global focus to aid management efforts and at the same time to 
create more intelligent local stewards of our world’s resources. 
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Appendices: 
Appendix I: Questions asked during fishermen interviews. 
Name, Age, Origin, Boat Type 
How many years have you fished? 
Why did you start fishing?  
Did your father fish? 
What gear do you use? 
What navigation and/or communication equipment do you take with you in the 
boat? (many respondents failed to understand this question without the addition of 
suggesting a map, a GPS, or a cell phone as possible answers) 
How many kilograms of fish do you catch in an average week? (Best guesses 
were encouraged as weighing of fish does not occur in the villages studied) 
How much do you keep for yourself and your family to eat? 
How many kilograms of fish did you catch in an average week when you started 
fishing? 
Do you ever feel pressure from other fishermen or the fisheries department to 
spend less time fishing, even using legal methods? 
Where do you sell your catch? 
How has the price of fish changed since you started fishing? 
Why do you think? 
How many days per month do you fish? 
How many days per month did you fish when you started fishing? 
 (If different from now) Why? 
If you see someone break a regulation do you report them, to whom and how do 
you report? 
Are the Menai Bay patrols effective? 
Are you aware of any fishing regulations in (insert village name)? (Respondents 
were asked to explain 2 or 3 that they were aware of) 
Do you know of any customs, traditions or taboos for when to fish and when not 
to fish in (insert village name)? 
Do you attend Kamati za Wavuvi meetings? 
What are the current problems with fishing in (insert village name)? 
Appendix II: Fishermen interviewed, and time of interview. 
Interview 
Start 
Interview 
End 
Interview 
Length Name Age 
9:47 10:02 0:15 Daudi Hamadi 39 
10:03 10:20 0:17 Muhammed Abul Achmed Salu 29 
10:28 10:44 0:16 Haji Juma 29 
10:45 11:00 0:15 Nuhu Ibrahim 39 
11:04 11:16 0:12 Nuhu Said 25 
11:20 11:34 0:14 Hasan Hatibu Kidete 21 
16:17 16:30 0:13 Isah Maulid 19 
16:38 16:52 0:14 Ali Hasan 47 
16:52 17:01 0:09 Hafud Musa 60 
17:01 17:13 0:12 Abdallah Ali 55 
17:14 17:23 0:09 Hasan Ibrahim Haji 70 
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17:24 17:34 0:10 Tahir Suleiman 35 
17:35 17:47 0:12 Ali Saidi 43 
17:53 18:03 0:10 Haladi Twalid Haj 42 
18:04 18:15 0:11 Hasan Ibrahim 35 
18:16 18:25 0:09 Juma Abdallah 35 
13:47 14:00 0:13 Juma Kamati Ali 45 
14:03 14:12 0:09 Ibrahim Hieri 36 
14:13 14:26 0:13 Daudi Simba 65 
14:27 14:39 0:12 Talib Hamis Muombawa 66 
14:42 14:50 0:08 Talid Ibrahim 40 
14:51 15:03 0:12 Hatid Amur 60 
15:35 15:48 0:13 Ibrahim Naim 40 
15:49 16:00 0:11 Ali Pandu 70 
16:13 16:22 0:09 Muhammed Ibrahim Haji 53 
16:31 16:42 0:11 Musah Machfun Musan 40 
16:43 16:55 0:12 Suluhu Abdallah 48 
17:00 17:06 0:06 Aboss Juma 29 
16:36 17:00 0:24 Fasihi Usi 39 
17:10 17:32 0:22 Siasa Pandu 35 
13:21 13:45 0:24 Haji Mrisho 40 
13:49 14:01 0:12 Mrisho Haji 60 
14:03 14:14 0:11 Pandu Abdallah 31 
14:16 14:30 0:14 Okala Muhammed 37 
15:02 15:13 0:11 Jafar Hasan 27 
15:15 15:29 0:14 Maudini Vahoda 36 
15:31 15:37 0:06 Ibrahim Haji 30 
15:38 15:44 0:06 Makame Hajaka 24 
15:47 15:56 0:09 Ujudi Kipatu 28 
16:10 16:20 0:10 Takima Abdallah 32 
16:20 16:26 0:06 Chum Yahaya 40 
16:27 16:33 0:06 Ahmed Haji 16 
16:34 16:40 0:06 Muada Haji Vuay 21 
9:42 9:52 0:10 Suleiman Kipatu 19 
10:02 10:11 0:09 Musa Jeca Vuoy 52 
10:16 10:26 0:10 Hasan Sinene 42 
10:28 10:38 0:10 Haji Pandu 69 
10:40 10:50 0:10 Daudi Abdallah 60 
10:52 11:01 0:09 Hamis Pandu 66 
11:20 11:28 0:08 Ali 45 
11:32 11:40 0:08 Haji Snak 52 
Appendix III: Government officials, local community members and other persons 
interviewed in an unstructured manner. 
Mr. Zahor Mohamed El Kharousy, Department of Fisheries Stone Town 
Juma Haji Ame, Fisheries Department: Menai Bay Conservation Area, Stone Town 
Okala Muhammed, Director of Jambeco: an NGO, Jambiani 
Haji Saburi Simai, Chairmen of the Kamati za Wavuvi, Jambiani 
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Jafar Hasan, English Teacher/Fishermen/Translator, Jambiani 
Halfan Isah, Financial Officer of the Menai Bay Conservation Area, Kizimkazi Dimbani 
Pandu, Business Owner/Fisherman, Kizimkazi Dimbani 
Khamis Ali Pandu, Restaurant Owner/Tour Guide Organizer in Kizimkazi Dimbani 
Aboss Juma, Chairmen of the Kamati za Wavuvi, Kizimkazi Dimbani 
 
